The previous article argued that hierarchy has inherent characteristics which make it a particularly efficient way to coordinate collective action. In this second part, I argue that there are a number of other factors explaining the prevalence of hierarchy, which are not necessarily due to its efficiency. These are, respectively: psychological biases, socially constructed values, and complementary institutions.

Psychological biases

There are two psychological biases that particularly facilitate the smooth functioning of hierarchy: our desire for security, and our responsiveness to authority and social status. Hierarchy tends to offer a more stable and predictable environment than many other forms of coordination: fixed roles and routines easily give an impression of stability, and higher ranks are often perceived as “bearing the brunt” of responsibility.^[1]

Many psychological experiments showcase our widespread tendency to bend to authority,^[2] a tendency which undoubtedly facilitates the subordination that is required for hierarchy to exist. German sociologist Robert Michels went as far as arguing that hierarchy satisfies a basic psychological need to be led.^[3] Whether such inclinations are innate or socially acquired remains to be discussed.

Shared values

Another intriguing observation is that people working in efficient organizations rarely think about hierarchy and subordination. Their work is most often given sense by a prevailing organizational ideology: a soldier fighting a war thinks that he is doing a service for his home country; a consultant working on his presentation slides thinks that he is adding value to the client’s business; a teacher thinks that he is educating tomorrow’s citizens – few think in terms of their contractual obligation to work.

This is not surprising. It has long been recognized by both scholars and gurus that workers motivated by strong personal values are less likely to shirk than those who are solely motivated by pure economic gain.^[4] The values with which workers identify are often part of what makes hierarchy work so well. Some accordingly argue that “the most effective hierarchies are ones in which subordinates have enough loyalty to the organization and to its leadership that they obey without needing to be forced.”^[5]

The adherence to shared sense-making values, which often legitimize hierarchy, has the notable benefit of reducing shirking and associated surveillance costs; it increases the efficiency with which organizations engage in concerted, large-scale collective action.

Complementary institutions

Finally, the prevalence of hierarchy likely cannot be explained without other complementary institutions. “Complementary” here implies that some institutions mutually reinforce each other. I will here focus on the effects of one particular type of institution, namely meritocracy.

The invention and first use of meritocracy is generally attributed to the Qin and Han dynasties of ancient China. In order to rule over an increasingly large empire, the Chinese emperor came to rely upon an intricate bureaucracy of civil servants.^[6] What differentiated this state apparatus from previous administrations was the fact that officials had to pass public tests and be appointed to positions according to their competence. This stands in stark contrast to the medieval European church and royal courts, where people were awarded positions of power because of inherited status or arbitrary nomination.

Meritocracy accordingly emerged through the addition of specific rules to the traditional hierarchical system. Positions are filled through what is proclaimed to be a fair contest. The nomination process constitutes a “contest” insofar as candidates are selected on the basis of how their performance compares to that of others (comparability). The contest is seen as “fair” when all eligible candidates face the same conditions (equal opportunity), and when the normative criteria according to which winners are selected are determined in advance (impartiality).

Whether these rules suffice to make a contest fair really depends on the context. Facing the same “legal” conditions does not mean that candidates start with equal chances, because there are always circumstantial factors that cannot be controlled for – individuals may start with fortunate advantages (e.g. due to personal experience, or superior physical attributes), while others may be subject to disadvantaging conditions (e.g. illness, emotional instability). And while selection criteria may be determined in advance, in practice the slightest possibility of prejudice or conflict of interest may skew the entire contest in favor of some particular candidate.

Yet despite these limitations, people often end up believing that candidates selected through a formally meritocratic contest have superior qualities (motivation, intelligence, socially skill), and that they are selected as a reward for these qualities. Nominations, whether for entry positions or for internal promotions, are believed to reflect the intrinsic competence, or “merit,” of the candidate. It is thus easy to see how meritocracy can add further legitimacy to the authority of decision-makers in a hierarchy. It is also easy to see how these may end up thinking of themselves as being “better” or “superior” to others.

My next entry scans the horizon for any possible alternatives to hierarchy, and how these alternatives should be envisaged from a reformist perspective.

Notes

[1] Havely, Chou and Galensky (2012).

[2] The most famous being those of Stanley Milgram (1963).

[3] Michels (1915: 240).

[4] For scholarly work see Ghoshal (1996), for guru material see Pink (2009).

[5] Heath (2001: 77).

[6] Burbank and Cooper (2010: 51).

References

Burbank, Jane and Frederick Cooper (2010). “Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference”, Princeton University Press.

Ghoshal, Sumantra and Peter Moran (1996). “Bad for Practice: A Critique of Transaction Cost Theory”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 13-47.

Havely, Nir, Eileen Y. Chou and Adam D. Galinsky (2011). “A functional model of hierarchy: Why, how and when vertical differentiation enhances group performance”, Organizational Psychology Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 32-52.

Heath, Joseph (2001). The Efficient Society. Penguin Books.

Michels, Robert (1915). Political parties: A sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. New York: The Free Press.

Milgram, Stanley (1963). “Behavioral Study of Obedience”, The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 371-378.

Pink, Daniel H. (2009). “Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us”, Penguin Books.